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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MITCHELL D. HENDERSON,
ILEEN BUTTARS, LAURENA B.
HENDERSON, and DAVID HALE

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Respondents
vs •
FOR-SHOR COMPANY

Supreme Court No. 20626

Defendant/Appellant
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The Court is referred to Appellant's original brief and to
Respondents1 Brief for a statement of issues presented on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Disposition of the Court Below
The Court is referred to Appellant's original brief and
Respondents1 brief for a statement regarding the nature of the
case and disposition in the Court below.
Statement of Facts
In addition to facts outlined by Appellant in its original
brief, Appellant offers the following facts:
1.

For-Shorfs invoices for rentals and purchases of forms

and equipment from For-Shor included a title retention agreement.
For-Shor retained title to all equipment rented and then
purchased by Henderson until the equipment had been completely
paid for.
2.

The payment of $6,400.00 by Mitchell Henderson was

applied to his then outstanding account and, pursuant to the
contract, was applied first to accrued interest, costs, and most

recent purchases and then applied to the purchase of the forms.
At no time did Henderson direct that said $6,400.00 payment was
to be applied to the purchase the forms or to give any directions
other than to apply said $6,400.00 on the account. (TV II p. 270,
1.19 - p. 271, 1.22)

As such, the forms had not been paid for

and title remained with For-Shor.
3.

The only forms that would or could have been purchased

by Ileen Buttars were the forms in which First Security Bank held
a security interest.

At no time did Mrs. Buttars believe or

understand that she was purchasing any other forms.

As stated in

Respondents Brief, Mrs. Buttars knew nothing of For-Shor, and,
therefore, could not and did not purchase forms originally
received from For-Shor.
4.

Although Mrs. Buttars had allegedly owned the forms for

a period of almost three years, the only time during the entire
three year period of claimed ownership in which any revenue was
generated from the forms was during a very brief three month
period from April, 1981 to July, 1981.
5.

Neither Mrs. Buttars nor Mitchell Henderson made any

effort after July 9, 1981, when the forms were repossesed, to
attempt to rent out the remaining forms or otherwise mitigate
possible damages.

This is so even though For-Shor repossesed

only approximately one-half of one set, and Mrs. buttars allegedly
purchased two and one-half sets, leaving two sets available to
rent.
6.

At no time during the trial did Plaintiff/Respondents

ever definitively state an amount claimed as damages for loss of

rentals. Even in Respondents Brief, Respondents state that the
"revenue for those three to four months was approximately
$2,500.00".

(See Respondents Brief, last line of page 5 to first

line of page 6, emphasis added.)
7.

At no time during the Trial did Plaintiffs/Respondents

offer sufficient evidence regarding the value of the forms.

At

no time did any witness give any specific value for the forms
repossesed by For-Shor Company.
8.

Exhibit 28, which contained a 1982 suggested price

list, was not introduced for the purpose of establishing the
value of the forms nor was it accepted for that purpose, and was
specifically objected to by Appellant's attorney.
9.

Even if For-Shor employees trespassed on Laurena

Henderson's property at the time of repossessing the forms, there
was no damage done to her property and there is no evidence in
support of an award of damages in any amount, let alone $100.00.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The court is referred to Appellant's original Brief for a
summary of Appellant's arguments and the issues raised by
Appellant on appeal.
In addition, Appellant replies to Respondents issues raised
on appeal as follows:
1.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

There is

no evidence that would justify an award of damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and the Trial
Court's refusal to award any damages was proper.
2.

Failure to Admit.

There is no basis to the claim that

the Trial Court abused its discretion in failing to award

attorney fees to Plaintiffs.

Defendant offered several reasons

as justifications for the appearance of the bankruptcy notice in
Defendant's files and the Court did not abuse it discretion in
accepting Defendant's reasons.
3.

Interference With Favorable Business Relationships.

There is no evidence of intent by For-Shor to interfere with any
business relationships.

For-Shor repossesed the forms in a

reasonable and prudent manner and relied on legal counsel in
repossessing forms. Furthermore, there is no evidence of damages
caused nor was it established that there was a business
relationship.
ARGUMENTS DIRECTED TO APPELLANT'S
ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL
I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIM FOR LOSS OF PROFITS OR RENTAL
Respondents claim that they are entitled to damages for loss
of rentals for a period of approximately three years from the
time the forms were repossesed by For-Shor until the trial, even
though no efforts were made by Plaintiffs to rent to forms for
the first three years that Mrs. Buttars claims to have owned the
forms.

Respondents claim that when Mitchell Henderson decided to

try to rent the forms, there were "plenty of takers" and that
"all of the forms in Cache Valley were being used that summer,"
(Respondents' Brief, p. 23) supposedly indicating that Plaintiffs
would have had no problem renting the forms steadily for the
additional three years.

The fact still remains that Plaintiffs'

only history of rentals was during a brief three month period
from April, 1981 to July, 1981, even though Mrs. Buttars had
allegedly owned the forms for three years.

To assume that

Plaintiffs would have continued to rent the forms at the same
rate, if at all, or that they would have completely rented the
forms to contractors for the entire forming season for the years
1982, 1983 and 1984, is totally speculative.

Plaintiffs offered

testimony indicating that Mitchell Henderson's health had been
poor for several years, eventually causing him to discontinue his
business in 1978 and seek help from his grandmother to pay the
loans on the forms to keep the bank from foreclosing on the
forms.

Plaintiff also claimed that his health was poor after the

repossession.

This testimony shows that Plaintiff did not have

the ability to rent the forms.
In addition,

Plaintiffs were not engaged in any ongoing

venture at the time of the repossession.
sporadic

Plaintiffs had only a

history of rentals over the three years of claimed

ownership.
Even if the Court were to allow damages for loss of
rentals, those rentals must be apportioned over the full three
years of claimed ownership, and the Court must consider that any
rentals generated were from two and one half sets.
only repossesed one-half set.

Defendant

Thus, Plaintiffs claimed rentals

of "approximately $2,500.00" (Defendant points out on page 33 of
its original brief that the Exhibits indicate rentals of only
$2,034.55) must be attributed to all of the forms for the full
three years, for total damages allowable over the next three

years claimed by Plaintiffs on the half-set repossesed by ForShor (1981-1984) of $500.00 ($2,500.00 X .25).
Plaintiffs also made no effort whatsoever to attempt to rent
the remaining forms or otherwise mitigate their damages.
Plaintiffs still had two full sets of forms available, even after
the half set had been repossesed by For-Shor.

There is no

testimony that Plaintiffs would have been required to combine
Mod-U-Form forms with Wall Master forms, because there was
apparently a full set of each kind.

Plaintiffs still had forms

to rent, but completely failed to rent any more forms following
the July 9, 1981 repossession.
It also makes no difference whether other Cache Valley
contractors were successful in keeping busy or that For-Shor
Company rented the forms it had repossesed for the three years.
Both Mr. Mortenson (a contractor) and For-Shor Company are highly
successful businesses with a proven track records spanning many
years.

The same cannot be said for either Mitchell Henderson or

David Hales.
In short, there is no evidence to justify a holding and
award of damages for loss of rents for a period of three years.
The evidence as presented to the Court simply does not justify
such an award.

Plaintiffs did not establish that they had the

ability and could have rented the forms for the entire three year
period had the forms been available, nor did Plaintiffs establish
the amount of rentals which would have been received even if the
forms had been available and had Plaintiffs been able to rent the
forms.

The Trial Court also did not properly apportion the

rentals over the full three years.

The loss of profit from

rentals claimed by Plaintiffs is simply too speculative and the
Court's award of damages for loss of rentals should be reversed.
II
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
THE VALUE OF THE FORMS REPOSSESSED BY FOR-SHOR
At no time did Plaintiffs establish the value of the forms
at the time they were taken form Laurena Hendersonfs property on
July 9, 1981.

During the trial, Plaintiff's attorney was

questioning James Snarr, the general manager of For-Shor Company,
attempting to have Mr. Snarr interpolate the value of new forms
as of 1984 based on a 1982 suggested price.

Defendant's counsel

then suggested to Plaintiff's attorney that he ask Mr. Snarr to
calculate and give testimony regarding the value of the forms
that were taken on July 9, 1981 as of the time they were taken.
This suggestion, however, was refused by Plaintiff's attorney.
The discussion was as follows (beginning with line 12 on page
440, TV III):
MR. JENKINS:

Counsel, maybe to save time, are you

asking him to calculate the value of the forms that were
taken on July 9, 1981?
MR. ZOLLINGER:
MR. JENKINS:
that.

Uh-huh.
Why don't you just ask him?

He can do

He's already done it.

MR. ZOLLINGER:
MR. JENKINS:
his testimony.

Afraid I might get the wrong answer.
He's already done it.

Well, it you want

Shortly thereafter, on cross examination, Defendant's
counsel asked Mr. Snarr if he could determine the value of the
forms at the time they were repossesed on July 9, 1981. (TV III
p. 442 1. 9-19, p. 443.)

Plaintiffs objected to the question,

claiming it to be based on hearsay and statements by Dan Sharp,
who had actually picked up the forms.

The Court overruled the

Plaintiff's objections and allowed the testimony.

The witness

then stated that he needed to make a few calculations.

Rather

than have Mr. Snarr make the calculations at that time to
determine the 1-981 price, Defendant's attorney decided to move on
to other questioning and never did ask Mr. Snarr to give a 1981
value.

At no other time during the entire trial did any person

offer testimony regarding the value of the forms at the time they
were taken.
Plaintiffs, however, attempted to determine the price for
the forms as follows:
1982 Price

1984 Price

Totals

55 2' X 8' panels

96.00 X 8% =

103.68

5,702.40

24 2' X 8" panels

53.00 X 8% =

57.24

1,373.76

2

8' X 6' inside corners

65.00 X 8% -

68.04

136.08

2

8' X 6f inside corners

32.00 X 8% =

34.56

69.12

.28

252.00

900 wedge bolts

.28 X ?

=

7 ,533.36
^76

Deduct 24% for used

$5,725.35
The above figures are based on Mr. Snarr's testimony
indicating that the 1984

price for the forms was approximately

8% higher than the 1982 price.

Plaintiffs then used the 1982

suggested price list (Exhibit 23) to obtain a figure for the
forms as of 1982, multiplied that figure by 8%, and then reduced
the figure by 24% for used forms, which was based on Mr. Snarr's
testimony calculating that the cost of reconditioning forms was
approximately 23.8% of the new price.
It should be noted, as stated in Appellant's original brief,
that Exhibits 26 and 28, which are the original and a copy of
the same thing were objected to by Defendant's counsel because the
Exhibits are prepared in an attempt to settle the law suit and as
an offer to settle the law suit.

The Court received the

documents under Rule 803 (6) of the Utah Rules of evidence as a
business record used by For-Shor in its business and only for
that purpose.

Thee Court further stated "I can't interpret it,"

(TV II p. 253 1. 11-13.)

Exhibits 26 and 28 were not accepted

into evidence for the purpose of establishing the value of the
forms as they were taken in 1981 , but only for the purpose of an
in-house record.

The method used by Plaintiffs, however, does

not determine nor offer any evidence as to the value of the forms
repossesed by For-Shor Company in July 1981.

The proper

determination of damages would be to establish the value of those
specific forms which were taken by For-Shor on July 9, 1 981 , and
not to attempt to take some other figure for other forms and
attempt to adjust those nebulous values to current values and
then reduce those values by a certain percentage because they were
used.

The forms repossesed by For-Shor could have been in

better or worse shape that the mythical forms for which
Plaintiffs attempted to establish a value.

Also, the forms were

repossesed in 1981 and the base price used by Plaintiff is an
alleged 1982 price.

Plaintiffs then tried to increase the price

to a 1984 price, the time of the trial, rather than showing a
1981 value.
Had Plaintiff simply asked Mr. Snarr during his testimony
what the value of those forms was at the time they were taken, Mr.
Snarr being an expert witness in such matters, the value could
have been established.

Plaintiffs could have further offered

other experts to determine a value of the forms at the time that
they were taken. However, Plaintiffs attempted to use some
circuitous method to arrive at their suggested value, and by
doing so utterly failed to establish any value for the forms.
Since there is no evidence or insufficient evidence,
regarding the value of the forms at the time they were taken, the
Trial Court's award of damages for the value of those forms must
be reversed.
ARGUMENTS DIRECTED TO RESPONDENT'S
ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL
III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED MITCHELL
HENDERSON'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF MENTAL DISTRESS.
Plaintiff, Mitchell Henderson, claims that he should be
compensated for his alleged mental anguish caused by For-Shor's
repossession of the forms. The Trial Court refused to award Mr.
Henderson damages, stating that no damages were awarded because
the forms were not his forms. Even if the Court ruled that the

forms belonged to Mr. Henderson or that it made no difference
who owned the forms, the Court could not have awarded damages for
Henderson's claim for intentional infliction of mental distress.
In order for Mr* Henderson to prevail on a claim for intentional
infliction of mental distress, the following elements must be proven:
1. The Defendant intentionally engaged in some
conduct toward the Plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of
inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any
reasonable person would have known that such would
result; and
2. his actions are of such a nature as to be
considered outrageous and intolerable and that they
offend against the generally accepted standards of
decency and of morality. Sams v. Eccles, 11 U.2d 289,
358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961).
The Arizona Supreme Court in the matter of Venerias v.
Johnson, 622 P.2d 55, 58 (Ariz. App., 1982), outlined the
elements of the tort as follows:
There are four elements which must coincide to
impose liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress: (1) The conduct must be intentional or
wreckless; (2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) There must be a causal connection between
the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and
(4) the emotional distress must be severe.
It should be noted that in Samms v. Eccles the Court
recognized a cause of action for intentional infliction of severe
emotional distress, thus closely paralleling the Arizona
elements, Arizona only adding the requirement for a causal
connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional
distress, which would be necessary in any claim for relief.
The following statements from the Restatement of Torts and
Prosser also indicate the requirements necessary to establish a
cause of action for' intentional infliction of emotional (mental)

In short, the rule stated in this section imposes
liability for intentionally causing severe emotional
distress in those situations in which the actor conduct
has gone beyond all reasonable bounds of decency. The
prohibited conduct is conduct which in the eyes of
decent men and women, in a civilized community, is considered outrageous and intolerable. Generally, the case
is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor and lead him to exclaim "outrageous".
Restatement of the Law, Torts, 1948 Supp., Sec. 46,
Comment G.
So far as it is possible to generalize from the cases,
the rule which seems to have emerged is that there is
liability for conduct exceeding all bounds usually
tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is
especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental
distress of a very serious kind. Law of Torts, 4th Edition,
William L. Prosser, page 56.
In Samms v. Eccles, the Supreme Court of Utah reversed the
District Court's dismissal of the action of Mrs. Samms, a married
woman, for injury resulting from severe emotional distress she
claimed to have suffered because the defendant persistently
annoyed her with proposals to have elicit sexual relations.

The

defendant had repeatedly and persistently called Mrs. Samms by
phone at various hours including late at night and on one
occasion came to her residence in connection with a solicitation
and made an indecent exposure of his person.

The trial court had

dismissed the claim for no cause of action on the basis that the
courts had been historically wary of the possible dangers in
opening doors for recovery of emotional distress because of the
highly subjective and volatile nature of the tort and the
difficulty of establishing damages.

The Supreme Court, however,

allowed the cause of action basing it on the elements as stated
above.

In a more recent case, First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feed
Yards, Utah, 653 P.2d 591, 598 (1982), this Court cautioned that
"damages for mental anguish are an extreme remedy, which should
be dispensed with caution."

In Midas Muffler v. Ellison, 650

P.2d 496 (Ariz. App., 1982) the Arizona Court recognized and
cited with authority the elements necessary to impose liability
for intentional infliction of emotional distress as stated in
Venerias v. Johnson, supra., in refusing to award damages for an
alleged infliction of severe emotional distress.

The Court

stressed the necessity of strictly complying with all of the
elements of the tort.

In that case, Midas Muffler was owed

$178.50 for the installation of a muffler on Ellison's vehicle.
The account was turned over to a collection agency and although
Ellison's had paid the amount claimed, the amount was not
properly credited by Midas.

Midas then referred the account to a

second collection agency which made six telephone calls over a
three month period, using abusive language, threatening to sue
and calling Mrs. Ellison a liar.

Mrs. Ellison claimed that she

became greatly distraught, had difficulty sleeping, and that the
calls made her cry.

The Arizona court ruled that the conduct

was not so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, stating:
"certainly six phone calls by Kiva [the collection agency]
over a period of three months cannot be considered excessive nor can we say that the languagae used by Kiva's
employee was so atrocious as to be utterly intolerable in
a civilized community." 650 P.2d at 500.
In the instant action, Plaintiff Mitchell Henderson has not
met any of the necessary elements in order to prove a cause of
action for intentional infliction of mental distress.

There is

no testimony, nor even an indication, that For-Shor intended to

cause any emotional distress to Mitchell Henderson.

For-Shorfs

claim to the forms is based on its title retention agreement and
its belief, after consultation with legal counsel, that it had a
right to properly repossess the forms.

The forms were

repossessed without incident and only the forms claimed by ForShor were repossessed.
The testimony also indicated that Mitchell Henderson had a
history of health problems leading to the failure of his business
and the resulting bankruptcy.

Any anguish caused by For-Shor's

repossession of the forms could not be considered to have been
caused by the repossession, but was a result of Mr. Henderson's
previous illnesses, physical infirmities, and business failure
prior to the repossession.

Furthermore, there was no showing of

any emotional distress after the repossession or that any
distress as may have been suffered by Mr. Henderson was severe.
Plaintiff complained only of headaches, sick stomach and other
stress-type illnesses as ulcers.
Plaintiff Mitchell Henderson failed to meet even one of the
elements necessary to allow the Court to award damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and he further
failed to prove any amount for damages, nor did Plaintiff attempt
to prove damages even had he been successful in making the claim.
The Trial Court's refusal to grant Mitchell Henderson's claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress must be sustained.

IV
THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUFFICIENT BASIS TO REFUSE
THE AWARD FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES REGARDING
THE BANKRUPTCY NOTICE.
Plaintiffs claim that they should have been awarded costs
and fees for proving that the bankruptcy notice discovered in
Defendant's files was of the same generation of copies originally
sent by the Bankruptcy Court.

Even assuming the copy came from

the Bankruptcy Court, that in no way proves that Defendant knew
or was aware of Mitchell Henderson's bankruptcy.

James Snarr,

general manager of For-Shor Company, testified that he had no
knowledge and at no time was aware of Mitchell Henderson's
bankruptcy until the filing of the action of Mr. Henderson.
(TV II, p.235, 1. 9-14) Dan Sharp, the former collection manager
for For-Shor Company, also testified that he did not know of any
bankruptcy filed by Mr. Henderson. (TV II, p. 305, 1. 6-12).
Even For-Shor's attorney, Mr. Burnett, was not aware of the
Bankruptcy.

(TV I, p. 152). Mr. Burnett stated that he had been

able to obtain a copy from the bankruptcy file in an effort to
explain how the notice could have been placed in the For-Shor
file.

Furthermore, Mr. Snarr testified that the address

indicated on the bankruptcy notice may have been sent to its
neighbor, Con-Shor Company.

The notice could have then been

later delivered to an employee of For-Shor who placed it in the
file without informing Mr. Snarr or other managers of the company.
In any event, the testimony is quite clear that For-Shor was
not aware of the Bankruptcy. Even if the form discovered in ForShor's file came from the Bankruptcy Court, it does not prove

that For-Shor knew of the bankruptcy.

Therefore, the Trial Court

was justified in not awarding costs and fees to Plaintiffs and
the Trial Court's decision should be upheld.
V
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY
INTERFERED WITH THE BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS OF
PLAINTIFFS
Plaintiffs claim that For-Shor's repossession of the forms
terminated the potential sale of forms from Mrs. Buttars to David
Hale, and further caused damage to Mr. Hale for losing business.
Although Defendant had learned of the existence of the forms
through David Hale, Defendant was not aware that David Hale was
intending to purchase those specific forms nor did Defendant
intend to interfere with any business relationships or contraacts
that may have existed between the Plaintiffs.

Defendant was

acting in a reasonable manner soley for the purpose of protecting
its interest.
The elements necessary to establish a claim for intentional
interference with prospective economic relations is outlined in
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Company v. Isom, Utah, 657 P.2d 293
(1982).

The Court outlined the elements as follows:

We recognize a common law cause of action for intentional
interference with prospective economic relations, and
adopt the Oregon definition of this tort. Under this
definition, in order to recover damages, the Plaintiff
must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintifffs existing or potential economic
relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means,
(3) causing injury to the plaintiff. 657 P.2d at 304.

In Leigh v. Isom, Leigh Furniture had pursued Isom to
repossess Isomfs interest in a furniture business, which Leigh
had sold to Isom, and to obtain a deficiency judgment.

Isom

counterclaimed for intentional interference with contractual
relations*

The jury entered a verdict for Isom on all matters.

Isom had purchased the furniture business from Leigh on contract
in 1970.

The contract also included a long term lease on the

building for ten years with an option to renew for an additional
ten years and also an option to purchase the building.

The facts

indicated that shortly after approximately one year, Leigh began
to harass and otherwise cause problems for Isom which lasted for
a period of more than three and one-half years, culminating in
the failure of Isomfs business.

Mr. Leigh and other associates,

including his wife, visited Isom at the store on an almost weekly
basis during one period of time to make demands and accusations
of Isom.

Leigh further made other demands of Isom to obtain a

partner and then refused to permit the association of the
partner.

Leigh refused to make payments or to provide

maintenance for the building pursuant to the lease agreement and
caused two frivolous law suits to be filed against Isom.

The

facts also indicated that Leigh wanted the building returned to
him and intended to force Isom out of business for the purpose of
terminating the lease in order to sell the building for a greater
profit.

This

Court concluded that the incidents taken

separately would not have been, in and of themselves, tortious,
and stated:

17

Even in small groups, these acts might be explained
as merely instances of aggressive or abrasive - though
not illegal or tortious - tactics, excesses that occur
in contractual or commercial relationships. But in
total and in cumulative effect, as a course of action
extending over a period of three and one-half years and
culminating in the failure of Isom's business, the
corporation's acts cross the threshold beyond what is
incidental and justifiable to what is tortious. 657 P.2d
at 306.
The facts of the instant case are very distinguishable and
are in no way similar to the facts in the Leigh case giving rise
to damages, and the facts and evidence in the instant action do
not satisfy the elements necessary for the Court to have awarded
damages for intentional interference with economic relations.
Those actions can be reviewed as follows:
Intentional Interference and Causation
There was no evidence at trial to indicate that For-Shor
Company intended to interfere with the prospective business
dealings between Mr. Hale and Mrs. Buttars.

Plaintiffs merely

speculate in their brief that For-Shor repossessed the forms upon
the supposition that it would destroy Mitchell Henderson's
business, eliminate competition, and require David Hale to rent
forms from For-Shor Company.
reason.

Such speculation goes beyond

For-Shor had ample business and did not need to "squeeze

out its competitors'1 nor did it need to resort to such tactics in
order to get business.

In fact, For-Shor was unaware that

Mitchell Henderson had even rented out the forms and did not know
that Mitchell Henderson considered himself to be in the business
of renting forms and, thus, in competition with For-Shor.
Even assuming that For-Shor intended to interfere with
Plaintiffs business, Plaintiffs did not prove that such

interference was the cause of any damages which may have been
suffered by Plaintiffs.
the forms.

There was no contract for the sale of

At best, Hale and Henderson merely contemplated the

transaction.

The testimony indicated that Mr. Hale was unable to

obtain financing and that he had no assets with which to purchase
the property.

Furthermore, Mr. Hale had never been in business

for himself, had only two confirmed jobs on which he anticipated
making only a few hundred dollars.

Quite clearly he had no

history or background with which to support or substantiate a
claim for future loss of profit or loss of business.

If indeed

Defendant did intend to put Hales out of business, the evidence
suggests that Defendant did him a favor because his "business"
was so poorly run he was losing money on each job. The evidence
presented at trial was insufficient and would force the Trial
Court, or this Court, to speculate at best as to what the nature
of the damages were.

Even in Plaintiff's Trial Brief, Plaintiffs

state that David Hale was forced to "expend approximately
$1,500.00 -- $2,000.00 in extra time, wages, rent and other
expenses to get jobs done." (Plaintiff's Trial Brief, top of page
9.)

Plaintiffs are still unsure of any damages which may have

been caused by any interference.
Therefore, even if Plaintiffs had been able to prove that
Defendant intentionally interfered with their business relations,
Plaintiffs did not and could not prove that such interference
caused any damages because Plaintiffs could not prove that they
had an ability to carry out their contemplated transactions.
Improper Purpose or Improper Means

Defendant reasonably believed that it had a right to
repossess the forms pursuant to its title retention agreement and
did so by proper means.

Defendant complied with all requirements

of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code in repossessing the property
and did not repossess the property for the purpose of injuring
the Plaintiffs or interfering with their relationships.
Therefore, Plaintiffs can not satisfy the second element
required.
Injury to Plaintiff
As stated earlier, Plaintiffs have been unable to show that
they have been injured or otherwise prove damages.
It should be further noted that Plaintiffs did not plead as
a cause of action interference with contract or interference with
business relationship.

However, as noted in Leigh, Defendant had

a privilege and a right to repossess the forms under the title
retention agreement.
CONCLUSION
Defendant has shown in this brief and in Defendant's
original brief that there was either no evidence or insufficient
evidence presented to the court in order to allow the Court to
award damages to Plaintiffs for loss of rentals and for the value
of the forms. The only evidence presented at trial was sketchy,
inconclusive and speculative.

Therefore, the judgment of the

District Court awarding damages to Plaintiffs should be reversed
on all counts.

Similarly, Plaintiffs failed to establish a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress or intentional
interference with prospective business relationships.

The

District Court's decision not to grant judgment to Plaintiffs for
no cause of action should be sustained, as well as the District
Court's refusal to grant attorneys fees and costs to Plaintiffs
for attempting to prove that Defendant was aware of Mitchel
Henderson's bankruptcy.
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